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SUMMARY 
Mechanisms of Constitutional Control: A preliminary 
observation of the Ethiopian system 
The present mechanism of constitutional adjudication in Ethiopia 
demonstrates unique features. The mechanism does not belong to any 
of the constitutional adjudication models operating in other countries. 
However, a well-developed system of constitutional adjudication is 
lacking in actual practice. The federal and regional state organs that 
exercise the power of constitutional control, i.e. the Council of Consti-
tutional Inquiry and the House of Federation at the federal level and 
the Constitutional Interpretation Commissions, Council of Nationa-
lities and Councils of Constitutional Inquiry at the regional level, are 
not functioning fully and, moreover, are not moving at equal pace. In 
some regional states, the institutions competent for constitutional 
control, though mentioned in the regional constitutions, are not even 
established yet. In other regions, these institutions have been 
75 established, but are not operating in practice. Besides, a challenge of 
judicial overlap is likely to emerge when the regional organs start to 
execute their task of constitutional control. Since no mechanism is 
devised to delimit the respective competences of the federal and state 
organs, overlap between federal and state institutions is inevitable. 
Furthermore, there is no clear guidance with regards to the role of the 
judiciary on matters that involve determination of constitutionality. 
Key Words: Constitutional Control, Federal Constitution, Regional 
Constitutions, Cases, Traditional and Religious Rules and Institutions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to provide an examination of the mechanisms of 
constitutional control as depicted in the present constitutional system 
of Ethiopia. In an attempt to do that, reference is made to the powers 
and functions of the House of Federation (the final authority in the 
interpretation of the federal constitution), to the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry and to the organs of the regional states that 
assume similar functions. It attempts to provide an overview and 
analysis of the background, legal basis and practices related to the 
powers and functions of the House and the Council and of the regional 
state organs with similar functions as of 1996; the time when this new 
approach was started to be practised at the federal state level. The 
exercise of constitutional control, as practised by many other 
countries, is mainly undertaken by the judiciary as an important aspect 
of its role of controlling against arbitrary exercise of governmental 
power. In the present constitutional system in Ethiopia, this role is 
mainly assumed by the second chamber of the federal parliament (the 
House of Federation) with the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
organised to assist it in the accomplishment of this task. 
The aim of this paper is therefore to examine the following issues. 
How is this function of determination of constitutionality and 
constitutional interpretation being executed? Which organ or organs 
are charged with this task? What is or what should be the role of the 
federal and state organs in this process of constitutional adjudication? 
How do these organs interact? What is the delimitation of jurisdiction 
between federal and state organs with regard to such a competence? 
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existing limited experience of constitutional adjudication as exercised 
by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and The House of Federation 
and on available local literature. With a view to provide a realistic 
account of the process, the author of this work has exerted his utmost 
effort to access the records of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
and the House of Federation and attempted to review the cases 
addressed by the Council and the House. These cases are reviewed 
with a view to provide the practical dimension of this process. For 
comparative analysis purposes, the paper has, in addition to the federal 
constitution, consulted the regional state constitutions of the states of 
Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromyia, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern 
Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, Somali, Gambella 
and Harari and relevant subsequent legislation. 
II. AN OVERVIEW 
Prior to the promulgation of the 1931 constitution, Ethiopia had no 
tradition of having a written constitution to regulate such issues like 
mechanisms of constitutional control and checks and balances. The 
first formal document was the 1931 constitution, which was modeled 
after the Japanese Meiji constitution. However, long before 1931, 
Ethiopia had legal texts that determined the power relations in the 
royal dynasty or the relations of the government with the church and 
the role of the church in the governance system. More specifically, the 
old tradition of Ethiopian history refers to much older Ethiopian legal 
texts like the Fitha Ngest, which is considered by legal scholars as an 
important development in Ethiopian legal tradition. This was a legal 
instrument that dealt with important aspects of the relationship 
between government, church and nobility. Pertaining to the then 
system of governance, it was necessary to determine the relationship 
between these organs that had an essential role in the whole system of 
governance. A wider consensus revolves around the view that the 
growing interactions with the West, the emergence of Ethiopian 
scholars educated in Europe and the growing diplomatic relations 
during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie were the major driving 
force that led to the promulgation of the first written constitution in 
1931. 
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centralization and modernization of the system of governance in 
Ethiopia. Its peculiar feature was that more power or almost all 
powers of the state were bestowed on the emperor. This was reflected 
explicitly in the constitution itself: 
"By virtue of his Imperial blood, as well as by the anointing which he 
has received, the person of the emperor is sacred, his dignity is 
inviolable and his power is indisputable. Consequently he is entitled 
to all the honors due to him in accordance with tradition and the 
present constitution. " 
A five-year colonial subjugation by the Italians ended in 1941 after a 
straggle for liberation. The involvement of the West in this struggle 
for liberation and its role in post-colonial Ethiopia gave rise to an 
increasing interest in modernising the Ethiopian legal system. As a 
result of this historical event and of other internal developments, a 
revised constitution was adopted in the Ethiopian legal system in 
1955. This revision of the 1931 constitution implied a change in the 
organisation of the system of governance, limiting the power of the 
emperor to a certain extent and a relatively better recognition of rights 
and freedoms. 
As a reaction to changes in the socio-political reality, written 
constitutions have subsequently been issued at different times. These 
were the 1974 draft constitution, issued by the emperor as a 
compromise to calm down the political turmoil (which merely ended 
up as a draft due to the deposition of the emperor before its adoption); 
the 1986 constitution which was promulgated during the military 
administration period; the 1991 charter which served as an interim 
constitution for the transitional period and the 1995 constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). Furthermore, 
regional state constitutions were promulgated in 1995 and these were 
amended between 2001 and 2003. 
The 1931 and 1955 constitutions, as pointed out by various authors 
and as some of the provisions of the constitutions themselves clearly 
imply, were more inclined to legitimize the all-embracing (executive, 
legislative and judicial) authority of the emperor. Compared to its 
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often cited by various authors, the introduction of a federal form of 
governance and the assignment of the competence of determining 
constitutionality to the second chamber of the parliament are among 
the notable features the 1995 constitution came up with. The 1995 
constitution protects fundamental rights and freedoms broadly 
recognized in a number of international human rights instruments. 
This necessitated putting appropriate mechanisms of constitutional 
control in place. 
Obviously the issue of who shall interpret the constitution and whether 
the power of interpreting the constitution shall be assigned to the 
judiciary or to an organ other than the judiciary has been the subject of 
debate. Depending on the socio-political realities that have influenced 
the process of constirution-malcing, constitution drafters of different 
countries have opted for an approach that, they believe, suits their 
realities. It seems that the current political trend in Ethiopia has 
greatly influenced the development in this regard and led to the 
adoption of a unique mechanism. Though different views are evolving 
this time around with regards to the role and extent of engagement of 
the House of Federation on issues of constitutional interpretation, the 
practice of according this power to the legislative arm of the state has 
prevailed over all other model options. 
Since member states of the Ethiopian federation have the legislative 
power to issue their own constitution, the competence of constitutional 
adjudication is organised in two tiers, i.e. at the federal and state level. 
Article 62 of the federal constitution and proclamation 251J2001 on 
the House of Federation have entrusted this power to the House of 
Federation. The House is thus empowered with the power to interpret 
the constitution and to determine the constitutionality of legislative or 
other acts. The Council of Constitutional Inquiry, by virtue of article 
84 of the FDRE constitution and proclamation 250(2001 on the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry, has the power to investigate consti-
tutional disputes and submit recommendations to the House of 
Federation. 
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the Council of Nationalities (in the Southern Nations Nationalities 
State) and to a Commission for Constitutional Interpretation in the 
states of Afar, Tigray, Amhara, Oromyia, Harari, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Gambella and Somali. All of the state constitutions envisaged 
the establishment, by the regional Council, of a constitutional organ 
(the Constitutional Inquiry Council) designed to assist the 
Commission for Constitutional Interpretation or the Council of 
Nationalities. In general, the present system of constitutional adjudi-
cation in Ethiopia at federal and state level includes the House of 
Federation, The Council of Nationalities, the Commission for Consti-
tutional Interpretation and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry. 
m. THE HOUSE OF FEDERATION 
With the advent of the 1995 constitution, a new form of government 
has been introduced into the Ethiopian constitutional system. Besides 
the transformation of the country from a unitary into a federal system 
of governance, a two chamber parliamentary system has been 
established, formed through direct popular election and, in the case of 
the House of Federation, through direct or indirect representation. The 
two chambers are the House of Peoples Representatives and The 
House of Federation. The House of Federation, which represents 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (whereby each Nation or Natio-
nality is represented by one representative and one additional 
representative for each one million of its population), is entrusted with 
powers that range from detemiining requests for the exercise of the 
right to self-determination to constitutional interpretation. 
With the introduction of this unique arrangement of constitutional 
adjudication the judiciary in Ethiopia is left aside from having a direct 
power on constitutional interpretation. Dr. Fasil Nahum has stated this 
as: 
"The Ethiopian Constitution, on the other hand, in a creative stroke 
provides for something quite different, emanating from and consistent 
with the overriding supremacy of the nations, nationalities and 
peoples whose sovereignty the constitution expresses... Thus the 
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of law, but the House of Federation", (Fas il Nahum, p. 59). 
This power is accorded to the Upper House of the parliament over and 
above its sensitive responsibilities of deciding on issues such as the 
request by nations, nationalities and peoples for the exercise of their 
self-determination rights up to secession. The task of constitutional 
adjudication and ruling on matters of constitutional interpretation is 
thus entrusted to the Upper House of the parliament that is to be 
assisted by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry. With such an 
explicit recognition of the power of the Upper House to be the 
ultimate authority on issues of such nature, the courts in Ethiopia are 
kept aside from dealing with those matters. This, however, does not 
seem to prevent them from applying the constitution in the day-to-day 
exercise of their duties and responsibilities. 
Proclamation 251|2001, which was enacted to consolidate the House 
of Federation of federal Ethiopia, has, among other things, attempted 
to elaborate on the functions of the House on matters of constitutional 
adjudication. With a view to ensure the implementation of this 
function, the House is empowered to organize the Council of Consti-
tutional Inquiry, to approve the rules of procedure for the Council, to 
make final decisions upon submissions for constitutional interpret-
tation by the Council, to receive appeals from dissatisfied parties 
whose cases have been rejected by the Council on grounds of no need 
for constitutional interpretation and to decide on submissions of the 
Council within thirty days. Though the House is obliged to give its 
decision on submissions of the Council within tiiirty days, in practice, 
cases are taking longer to resolve. 
IV. THE COUNCIL OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INQUIRY 
As hinted at in the preceding discussion, the unique aspect of the 
present system of constitutional adjudication in Ethiopia is demon-
strated in the fact that a combined setting of a professional and 
political approach is formed to handle the task of constitutional 
adjudication. A similar pattern is also followed at state level where the 
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and Council of Constitutional Inquiry are envisaged to be engaged in 
this matter. The Council of Constitutional Inquiry has been established 
at the federal level as well as in a few regional states. At the regional 
state level, the states of Amhara, Oromiya and Southern Nations 
Nationalities have already established a Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry. At the federal level, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry was 
established in 1996 and some of its members are already serving their 
second term. 
Unlike its counterparts in many other countries, the composition of the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry is not confined to judges. The 
constitution arranged it for the Council to have eleven members of 
different mix of which six is "...legal experts of proven professional 
competence and high moral standing..." to be appointed by the head 
of state upon recommendation of the House of Peoples Represen-
tatives. The federal Council of Constitutional Inquiry (the regional 
Councils of Constitutional Inquiry have a similar composition) is 
therefore composed of the president and vice-president of the federal 
supreme court who occupy the position ex officio (to serve as 
chairman and deputy chairman of the Council), six legal experts 
appointed by the president of the republic on recommendation of the 
House of Peoples Representatives for their proven professional 
competence and high moral standing, and three persons designated by 
the House of Federation from among its members. 
Members of the Council have their terms of office determined accor-
ding to their way of inclusion in the Council. Hence, the ex officio 
members have their term for as long as the period of their position in 
the Supreme Court lasts, the six legal experts have a term equal to that 
of the president of the republic, i.e. six years, and they can also be re-
nominated and the term of members designated by the House of 
Federation equals the term of this House. 
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry proclamation provides some 
guidance as to the appointment, term of office of members of the 
Council and removal of their membership. However, the proclamation 
does not seem to have sufficient prescriptions for issues that might 
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authorised to remove members of the Council subject to good cause 
and the removal is effected upon approval of a majority vote of the 
House of Federation. The fact that what constitutes a good cause for 
removal of a member of the Council is not clarified, is likely to cause 
tenure insecurity which, as a result, could have the effect of under-
mining the independence of members of such an important institution. 
Obviously, the ex officio positions are not subject to such a threat. In 
view of strengthening the institutional independence of the organ, this 
is a point worth considering. At state level, since this organ is not fully 
established or organised, it is necessary that state authorities be aware 
of the importance of a clear determination of such issues and address 
it in a way that helps create a strong and independent institution. 
Parallel to that, revisiting the working rules of procedure at the federal 
level is also important. 
The unique nature of the mechanism of constitutional interpretation 
applied by Ethiopia since the adoption of the 1995 constitution is not 
only reflected in the nature of the organ entrusted with the power of 
constitutional interpretation but also in the composition of the mem-
bers of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry. More specifically, as 
indicated above, non-legal professionals are included as members and 
this is not a common practice in many systems. Membership in the 
Council therefore is not restricted to legal experts. Eight of them are 
obviously legal professionals as the constitution prescribes that six 
members should be lawyers of proven professional competence and 
integrity. The other two are judges by their position in the Supreme 
Court. The remaining members however may or may not be legal 
experts since their membership is not conditioned on their pro-
fessional competence but their representative capacity. 
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry has the power to investigate 
constitutional disputes and to submit recommendations to the House 
of Federation should it find interpretation of the constitution 
necessary. As stipulated in the rules of procedure of the Council and 
the Council of Constitutional Inquiry proclamation, the Council may 
receive cases from the House of Federation, state legislative and 
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sits quarterly but an extraordinary meeting may also be called. 
Though its rulings are non-binding, as they are subject to approval by 
the House of Federation, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry still 
influences to an important degree the protection of human rights and 
the sustainment of democracy. Given the level of recognition accorded 
by the constitution to the respect for and protection of human rights, 
the role of the Council and the House of Federation in sustaining 
democracy and the protection of human rights is immense. Their 
involvement and interaction in matters of constitutional adjudication is 
thus of significant importance in ensuring the constitutional gua-
rantees. 
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry was established in 1996 to deal 
with issues of constitutional interpretation. The Council exercises a 
power of investigating constitutional issues and submits recommen-
dations to the House of Federation for constitutional interpretation 
when there is a case meriting constitutional interpretation. In prior 
times there was no such arrangement in the 1931 and 1955 constitu-
tions and in the 1986 constitution this was a power vested in the 
Council of state, the supreme law making organ of the then regime. 
Exercising its constitutional powers, the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry has adopted its own rules of procedure, which have been 
approved by The House of Federation. Along with that, it has 
determined the persons or organizations that could institute a case 
before it and the mode of presentation of applications. Guided by the 
constitution, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry proclamation and 
the rules of procedure together with the adjudication process as 
practised by the Council for a decade have enabled parties to bring 
their case before the Council and to The House of Federation on an 
appeal basis. 
Slowly the present constitutional interpretation system in Ethiopia, 
especially with the advent of some important cases like the 
Benishangul-Gumuz election case and the Kedija Beshir case related 
to adjudication by religious laws and institutions, is moving towards 
84 influencing the legal and constitutional system in general. However, 
the fact that the Council is organised to work in sessions convening on 
a quarterly basis does not enable it to be as accessible as it should be. 
Some suggest that the Council cannot deliver what is expected of it 
unless it is made to work on a full-time basis. Taking account of the 
level of complexity of cases reaching the Council this appears to be a 
sound proposition. 
V. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COUNCIL 
Initiation of cases for constitutional adjudication is an important 
aspect of the constitutional adjudication process. As this is an 
important aspect of empowering citizens, it holds a key place in the 
whole process of adjudication. According to the rules of procedure of 
the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the Council of Constitu-
tional Inquiry proclamation, the House of Federation, state legislative 
and executive bodies, courts and any interested party are allowed to 
launch the process. These instruments have provided indicative provi-
sions on who has the right to initiate cases for constitutional 
adjudication and accordingly the aforementioned organs are the ones 
who are allowed to petition a case with the House of Federation or the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry. Accordingly, in the current system 
of constitutional adjudication an issue could arise with or in the 
absence of court litigation. 
Compared to the general provision under article 84 of the federal 
constitution, the rules of procedure adopted by the Council of Consti-
tutional Inquiry went further in elaborating upon what was stated in 
general terms in the constitution and gave a list of those who are 
authorised to launch a constitutional adjudication. Of the listings in 
the constitution, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry proclamation 
and the rules of procedure, it is the part that empowers an interested 
party that has the potential to be the subject of controversy. This could 
particularly be the case when the issue of constitutionality refers to the 
exercise of legislative or executive power. Such a situation has the 
ability to attract parties of direct or indirect interest such as human 
rights advocacy groups. The scope of those who or which are consi-
dered an 'interested party' and entitled to exercise the right to initiate 
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controversy. 
The way this provision is framed leaves room for its invocation by 
advocacy groups to initiate a case for constitutional adjudication when 
especially it involves alleged violations of human rights. That seems 
to be the reason why the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association for 
instance has instituted a case on behalf of a woman who had contested 
adjudication of an inheritance case by a religious court against her 
consent as unconstitutional. The association intervened with a view 
that the way the case under consideration was handled by the religious 
court as well as by the regular court had a far-reaching effect of 
jeopardizing women's rights in general. This provision could even 
open the possibility for extended standing to initiate cases for 
constitutional adjudication by a number of actors which could among 
others include Human Rights NGOs, political parties and moreover 
that could include the newly established national institutions of The 
Human Rights Commission and The Office of The Ombudsman. 
Records of the registrar of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and 
of the House of Federation reveal that, during its ten-year period of 
office, the Council has investigated plenty of issues alleged to involve 
constitutional adjudication. The majority of the cases that reached the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry have been rejected on grounds of 
not meriting constitutional interpretation. Out of the cases recorded in 
the registrar of the Council, five cases were related to legislative acts 
alleged to contravene the constitution. These are the Land Law 
enacted by the Amhara state Council, the Federal Anti Corruption 
Proclamation, The Election Proclamation, Special Prosecutor Esta-
blishment Proclamation and Consolidation of the House of Federation 
Proclamation, all of which were declared to be constitutional. 
A significant number of the cases were rejected for reasons of not 
exhausting the remedies offered by government institutions having the 
power to consider and decide on the matter. The Council of Constitu-
tional Inquiry Proclamation requires that a case should first be 
investigated as to whether it has exhausted all the possibilities for 
seeking remedies from different and relevant institutions of admi-
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linkage to a regional constitution and the Council thus decided that 
their détermination was within the competence of the state Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry. This is interesting when viewed against the 
situation of the non-operation or non-existence in some regions of 
state Councils of Constitutional Inquiry. Few cases also arose in 
relation to adjudication by religious courts against the will of one of 
the parties and a couple of cases were related to self-determination 
demands made by applicants claiming recognition as a group of 
separate ethnic identity. The Denta Debemo, Bahrework Mesmes and 
the Silte cases of the Southern Nation Nationalities Peoples State are 
the notable cases in this regard. One case that was raised had to do 
with the contesting of a ruling of the election board and was finally 
decided by the House of Federation. 
In undertaking its task of deterrnining the constitutionality of an act or 
practice of the government or of an individual or the constitutionality 
of a legislative act, the Council is obliged to follow principles of 
interpretation as determined by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
proclamation and to be developed by it. 
VI. PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 
An exercise of power of constitutional adjudication has to follow 
certain guidelines. In the interest of the proper execution of this task, 
the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the House of Federation are 
supposed to apply certain principles in executing their respective tasks 
of submitting recommendation to the House of Federation and inter-
preting the constitution. Except for what is provided in the consti-
tution in a very general manner, to date it seems that no clear set of 
principles of interpretation have been established to guide the process 
of adjudication. With the adoption of the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry Proclamation in 2001 there seems to have been some partial 
move in this direction. By way of confirmation of the principles 
provided in the constitution, the proclamation authorised and required 
the Council to develop and implement principles of interpretation, 
which it believes can help a executing its task of investigating issues 
of constitutionality and submitting recommendations to the House of 
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Proclamation also requires it to ensure conformity of its work with the 
principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenants on Human rights and International Instru-
ments adopted by Ethiopia. The House of Federation in similar 
fashion is authorised to develop and implement principles applicable 
to constitutional interpretation and ensure conformity of the execution 
of its task with the principles enshrined in the aforementioned human 
rights instruments. The fact that both organs are authorised to identify 
and implement principles of interpretation might cause overlap. 
However, the fact that the exclusive competence to render final rulings 
on adjudication is accorded to the House could take care of the 
possible overlap that might arise in practice. 
VII. RULINGS OF THE COUNCIL AND THE 
HOUSE 
The Council and the House, over the last ten years have handed down 
few decisions, but decisions of profound impact. As stated above, the 
sizable part of cases that reached the Council was struck out at a 
prelirninary stage on grounds of not meriting constitutional adjudi-
cation. But there were also a few important cases heard by the Council 
and submitted to the House of Federation for a final ruling. Reference 
to the records of the registrar of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
indicates that to date nearly two third of the cases that reached the 
registrar of the Council are struck out at first instance and that the 
Council submitted its recommendation for constitutional interpretation 
to the House only for a very small number of cases. By case category, 
the majority of the cases were initiated by private parties and only five 
cases had to do with contesting the constitutionality of laws adopted 
by the House of Peoples Representatives and regional parliaments. 
The rest of the cases implied contesting the constitutionality of 
decisions of federal and state executive organs or court rulings. The 
cases contesting court rulings give the impression that parties to these 
cases considered this forum as another level of appeal against rulings 
in cassation or appellate level courts. Therefore, the tasks of the 
Council and the House in this regard do not seem to be familiar to the 
public. 
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entertained by the Council as meriting constitutional adjudication. 
The following cases can be mentioned as landmark cases where the 
role of the Council and the House of Federation as interpreters of the 
constitution has been exercised. 
The election right case 
This case was initiated by a group of persons from the Bambasi and 
Assosa woreda of the Benishangul-Gumuz state who claimed to 
belong to and represent the Amhara, Oromo, Agew and Tigray 
nationalities, residents of the area. They contested the constitutionality 
of a decision of the Election Board banning them from running for 
election on grounds of not knowing the language of the electoral 
district, and of article 38 of proclamation 111|95. They argued that the 
decision of the board and article 38 of the said proclamation contra-
dicted article 38 of the constitution, a provision that guarantees the 
right to vote and to be elected. On reference by the House of 
Federation (citing articles 62 and 84 of the constitution) the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry considered the case and submitted its recom-
mendation stating the unconstitutionality of the decision of the board 
and of the contested provision of the proclamation. The recom-
mendation was passed by a majority vote of five to two and was 
forwarded to the House of Federation on 7 July 2000. 
The minority opinion argued that the alleged proclamation did not 
have any inconsistency with the constitution and that the decision of 
the electoral board, as it had been decided based on the alleged law 
was also constitutional. The minority opinion reiterated that article 38 
of the said proclamation, requiring a candidate to know the language 
of the electoral district as a requirement to qualify and be able to run 
for election, is not solely aimed at excluding those who do not know 
the local language, but is inspired by the concern that the candidates 
have to know the language of their constituency. The minority further 
argued that language is an important aspect of rights such as the right 
to self-rule and is an expression of the special place of and recognition 
accorded to the identity of nations and nationalities. Furthermore, this 
provision has not prohibited someone from mnning for election 
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requires him or her to know the language of that group he or she is 
intending to represent. The minority opinion is also of the view that 
election is not a right without any limit; it is rather subjected to limits 
that can be imposed by law. Given these facts, the minority opinion 
argued there is no reason for finding the law and the subsequent 
decision passed by the election board discriminatory and in contra-
diction with the constitution. 
The House of Federation in its first regular session of the first year of 
its term referred the opinion of the Council to the legal affairs 
committee. It instructed the committee to study the recommendation 
of the Council and propose an opinion for the final ruling by the 
House. Based on the deliberation of the committee, the House decided 
the case in its second regular session of the third year term of the 
House. In delivering its final verdict the House declared the alleged 
proclamation constitutional and the decision of the board unconsti-
tutional referring to its decision of excluding those candidates who are 
running for the federal parliament. Accordingly the House decided 
that the decision of the board shall remain non-enforceable and 
instructed all federal and state organs of the government to ensure 
enforcement of this decision. 
The Silte case 
Two applicants, who claimed to represent the community, initially 
filed this case. They filed their case with the House of Federation and 
this was later followed by an application from a person who by that 
time was a member of the House of Peoples Representatives and of 
the Silte Democratic Unity Party. The applicants, referring to the fact 
that their people had been considered as Gurage against their will for a 
long period in denial of their right to self-determination, requested the 
House to ensure the exercise of their constitutional right. They 
stressed that the Silte are not Gurage, but people with their own 
language, territory and history and argued that their being considered 
Gurage contravened their right to self-determination. The Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, upon referral from the House, considered the 
case. Upon referral of the case the House asked the Council to deal 
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to determination of ethnic identity of a community and what 
procedure should be followed to reach a decision on such matter? 
Based on an opinion forwarded by the Council the case was referred 
back to the regional Council. 
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry, in its opinion to the House, has 
emphasised the principle of exhaustion of local remedies and gave the 
opinion that the matter should be considered first by the regional 
mechanisms and indicated that the interested party or parties can bring 
their case back to the House of Federation if they feel the decision of 
the state Council is delivered in a manner that contradicts the consti-
tution. The Council, in its opinion forwarded to the House, suggested 
that in dealing with this issue, the state Council needs to observe that 
the process of determination of this issue is conducted with direct 
participation of the community that raises the question, by secret 
ballot, in a free and fair manner and is attended by impartial observers. 
Kedija Beshir case 
This case was submitted to The Council of Constitutional Inquiry by 
an application filed by the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association on 
behalf of Kedija Beshir. It refers to a decision on an inheritance case 
by a Naiba court based on the Sharia law. Before its submission to the 
Council, the case had passed through the appeal stages up to the 
Supreme sharia court and finally the Federal Supreme Court cassation 
division of the regular court. The decision of the Naiba court was 
upheld at all levels. The present applicant (in whose name the Ethio-
pian Women Lawyers Association filed the complaint) and three other 
co-defendants together originally fded their objection to the Naiba 
court itself, stating their unwillingness for the case to be considered by 
this religious court. However the court to which the objection was 
filed ruled against the objection and proceeded to deal with the merits 
of the case and delivered its decision according to the laws of the 
sharia. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association extended its 
assistance to the applicant with a view that the way this case was 
handled at all levels of the court it passed through, jeopardised rights 
of women in general by contravening constitutionally recognised 
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Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association, brought the case to the 
attention of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry challenging the 
ruling of the Naiba court and the further corrfirmation of its decision 
by the highest religious and regular courts of the country as unconsti-
tutional. 
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry examined the case and reached 
the conclusion that the way this case was resolved by the courts at all 
levels contravened article 34 (5) of the constitution - a provision that 
recognises the right of the parties to adjudication of disputes by 
religious or customary institutions. According to this provision, 
disputes relating to personal and family matters can be handled by 
religious or customary institutions only with the consent of parties to 
the dispute. Accordingly, the Council stated that the jurisdiction of 
religious or customary adjudication doesn't assume a compulsory 
jurisdiction. Thus the determination of the matter by the Naiba court 
against the consent of the parties to the dispute, was unconstitutional. 
This was so because the case was tried by the Nabia court (a religious 
court) against the objection of the parties to the dispute, while it was a 
dispute related to a family matter that needed to secure the consent of 
the parties as a prerequisite. The Council thus reached the conclusion 
that the decision of the courts (both the religious and the formal court) 
in this case contravened the constitution and delivered its opinion to 
the House of Federation. The House of Federation, in its second 
regular session of the fourth year of its term, approved the submission 
of the Council and decided the ruling of the courts was unconsti-
tutional. 
Recently the federal Council of Constitutional Inquiry has more cases 
directly and indirectly related to the exercise of electoral rights. 
Leaders of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy filed a case 
contesting the decision of the Prime Minister banning demonstration 
in Addis Ababa city following the post electoral unrest. The Council 
rejected the case, alleging that the contested act was undertaken within 
the role of the Prime Minister as the chief of the federal government. 
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republic from 1995 to 2001) contested the constitutionality of a law 
promulgated to provide for the administration of the president. He 
noted that proclamation 255|2001, which was promulgated to 
determine the administration of the president, contravened the 
constitutional rights to opinion, thought and expression and the right 
to vote and be elected. He pointed to the provision of the said procla-
mation, which reads "the president shall be obliged to keep himself 
aloof from any partisan political movement during or after his presi-
dency. " Failure to discharge these and other obligations set by this 
proclamation causes termination of the privileges and benefits that the 
ex-president is entitled to receive. This, he argued, infringes the 
constitutional right to vote and be elected. The Council struck out the 
case as not meriting investigation stating that the contested legislation 
doesn't prevent the president from exercising his rights but required 
him to remain non-partisan so that he can claim the privileges and 
benefits granted to ex-presidents by the contested law. 
VIII. STATE JURISDICTIONS 
Owing to the dual setup of the legislative, executive and judicial 
power and pursuant to article 52 (2) (b) of the FDRE constitution, 
states have the power "to enact and execute state constitutions and 
other laws. " Accordingly, each member state of the Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia does have its constitution and consti-
tutional adjudication is one of the issues addressed by these state 
constitutions. All the state constitutions, i.e. the revised constitutions 
of Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromyia, SNNPRS, Somali, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Gambella and Harari states, have devoted a part of their text 
to this issue. These constitutions came up with few, though major, 
changes to the contents of the constitutions they amend. 
As has been hinted at in the preceding discussion, in the previous state 
constitutions power of constitutional interpretation was entrusted to 
the single chamber state parliament. One of the changes was that the 
power to render an ultimate ruling on matters of constitutional adjudi-
cation was designated to be the competence of the state Constitutional 
Interpretation Commission in the constitutions of the states of Tigray, 
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of the Council of Nationalities in the Southern Region State constitu-
tion. Accordingly, the Southern region state constitution provided for 
the establishment of two Councils, i.e. the state Council and Council 
of Nationalities. The Council of Nationalities is established by repre-
sentation from nations, nationalities and peoples of the state and 
entrusted with the power to interpret the state constitution. This 
Council is organised almost in a manner identical to the House of 
Federation and assumed the authority to render the ultimate ruling on 
the interpretation of the state constitution. 
State constitutions anticipate the establishment of the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry to assist the Commission for Constitutional 
Interpretation or Council of Nationalities in their task of interpreting 
the constitution. To date, only some states (Amhara, Oromyia and 
Southern Region State) have taken the lead in estabhshing the Council 
of Constitutional Inquiry. The composition of the state Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry is similar to the federal one in all the nine 
states. Accordingly state Councils of Constitutional Inquiry comprise 
the president and vice president of the state supreme court, six legal 
experts of proven professional competence and high moral standing to 
be appointed by the state Council on recommendation by the chief 
executive and three members to be designated from the Council of 
Nationalities in the Southern region and from the state Council in all 
other regions. 
The scope of competence of federal vis-à-vis state Councils of 
Constitutional Inquiry and of the House of Federation vis-à-vis state 
Commissions for Constitutional Interpretation or Council of Nationa-
lities remains yet unclear. Whereas, on the other hand, cases seeking 
determination of constitutionality are rejected on grounds of non-
exhaustion of local remedies of which the state Council of Consti-
tutional Inquiry is considered one mechanism. This is being done by 
the federal Council of Constitutional Inquiry as the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry proclamation provides that a case may be 
submitted to the Council if it has exhausted the local remedies as 
stated under article 23 of this proclamation which reads: 
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have been violated by the final decision of any government institution 
or official may present his case to the Council of constitutional 
inquiry for constitutional interpretation. 
Any appeal, under sub article (1) of this article, may be made to the 
Council if the case has been exhausted by the government institution 
having the power with due hierarchy to consider it. 
Final decision, under sub article (1) and (2) of this article, shall mean 
an adjudication that has been exhausted and against which no appeal 
lies on the same path way. " 
Because of the degree of similarity exhibited in the contents of the 
state and federal constitutions (especially part three of the federal and 
state constitutions), jurisdiction overlap over constitutional adjudica-
tion is highly likely to occur between the competent federal and state 
organs. The fact that the practice of constitutional adjudication is a 
new practice organised in a unique manner and that sufficient practice 
has not yet developed poses a problem to which the system has to give 
an answer. 
This dual system of constitutional control could cause the same act of 
the legislative or the executive to be challenged both at the federal and 
state Council of Constitutional Inquiry or a case on which ruling is 
delivered by the federal organ could possibly be instituted as a new 
case at the regional level. 
Thus the system has to look for a way that enables the dual system to 
work within the confines of the areas of competence delimited for 
each. One may assume that state organs for constitutional interpre-
tation have jurisdiction only over cases related to state laws and state 
acts; however there is the possibility that a case can be filed at the 
federal Council of Constitutional Inquiry while it is a case that has 
already been disposed of by a state Commission for Constitutional 
Interpretation. This has already been experienced in the judiciary 
where cases tried and finally decided by state court of cassation divi-
sions were taken on appeal to the federal Supreme Court cassation 
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proceedings are not immune from that. Such possibility implies that 
this undetermined situation could in the future be a source of debate 
on matters of constitutional adjudication. As cases of that type have 
not been encountered yet, there is no evidence to prove this arrange-
ment as uniquely problematic but one can however foresee that it is 
likely to cause a challenge and that is a problem the system has to 
address. 
No matter the reason why this hasn't happened yet and why no case 
has been registered at state level (even in the regions where the effort 
to establish the Council has been exerted) it is an issue that seeks 
attention. This matter is likely to be tested especially when institutions 
like the Human Rights Commission and The Office of the Ombuds-
man come to function fully and may launch cases. They have the 
objective of looking into the compatibility of actions and legislation or 
directives issued by the government with the standards of human 
rights and the constitution. 
IX. EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS 
Countries with different mechanisms of constitutional adjudication 
follow their own approach towards the effect of constitutional 
interpretation. Under the Ethiopian system it is decided by legislation 
as to what the effect of a constitutional interpretation decision should 
be. This was a matter that had not been clarified for sometime. 
Though the constitution entered into force in August 1995 and the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry was established in 1996 and has 
been operating since then, the proclamation that has clarified this 
matter (proclamation no 251|2001; a proclamation to consolidate the 
House of Federation) was only adopted in 2001. In between this 
period the Council and the House have entertained plenty of cases in 
the absence of a clear determination on effects of final rulings on 
constitutional adjudication. 
The proclamation has now made it clear that the decision of the House 
on constitutional adjudication shall have an effect as of the date of the 
decision and the decision shall remain applicable to similar issues that 
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field as it has introduced a precedent system; a practice peculiar to the 
common law system has thus been introduced into the predominantly 
civilian legal tradition. As a country of civil law tradition there is no 
possibility for the introduction of judge-made laws in Ethiopia. Law 
making is the sole responsibility of the legislative arm of the state. A 
sudden departure is exhibited with the adoption of this precedence 
system for the constitutional adjudication. It is provided in an explicit 
way that decisions of the House shall apply to future similar cases. 
Though the constitution was not express in this respect and even if the 
Council has, for sometime since its establishment in 1996, worked in 
the absence of a clear determination in this regard, it has now this 
system to apply. 
The proclamation has instructed that the decisions of the House shall 
be published in a special issue. This arrangement helps to ensure 
enforceability of decisions of the House. Pursuant to this system of 
according the precedent effect to final rulings of constitutional adju-
dication, decisions of the House are going to have the effect of law 
and seek observance by all concerned persons or organs. For a law to 
enter into force, publication in the official Negarit Gazzeta is required. 
However this is not required for the rulings of the House in cases of 
constitutional adjudication. Publication of a special issue is taken as 
an alternative for that. The House, as the final authority on matters of 
constitutional adjudication, is required to ensure publication of its 
rulings in a special publication issued for this purpose. This is an 
important task that needs to be implemented with due care and with 
sufficient distribution, as such rulings are going to have significant 
effect. 
In the face of the dual setup of constitutional adjudication, publication 
will be of significant importance, because that will help enable 
persons and organs authorized to launch cases for constitutional adju-
dication to check whether the House has considered the case and a 
ruling has been rendered on it. It is also necessary for the legislative, 
executive and judicial organs to be kept informed of such decisions 
that affect their daily work. 
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legislatures have to be consulted, especially when the process of 
constitutional adjudication involves a law the constitutionality of 
which is contested. With the dual law-making being in place in 
Ethiopia this appears to be a matter that needs to be considered with 
care and due diligence. It appears that this is the reason for inclusion 
of article 16 (2) of the proclamation on the House of Federation which 
provides that the federal or the state legislative body may be commu-
nicated with within six months so that it amends, changes or repeals 
the law in question before a final decision of unconstitutionality is 
rendered by the House. 
X. ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
The judiciary is an institution that assumes a key role in the process of 
ensuring democracy and the rule of law. The judicial branch of the 
state is normally charged with the task of ensuring protection of rights 
and freedoms recognised by the constitution and subsequent legal 
sources. Hence, constitutional recognition is accorded to the judiciary 
and to its existence as an organ independent of the control of the 
executive branch of the state. Through the exercise of its judicial 
function the judiciary doesn't end up merely resolving disputes 
between or among parties to a dispute, but also plays a key role in 
deterring arbitrary exercise of governmental power. In the present 
system of the judiciary in Ethiopia the supreme judicial authority is 
vested in the Federal and State Supreme Courts in their respective 
jurisdictions. 
The stated task of the judiciary keeps the judiciary closer to the 
functions of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, the House of 
Federation and the state Constitutional Interpretation Commission or 
Council of Nationalities. In its daily practice, the judiciary is the 
primary institution where the constitution is to be under constant 
consideration. The challenge however is that a clear delimitation of 
competence in connection to matters that involve determination of 
constitutionality has not yet been developed to govern the relationship 
between the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the House of 
Federation on the one hand and the judiciary on the other hand. It is 
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relationship between those organs in a limited way. The constitution 
and the proclamation on the Council of Constitutional Inquiry stipu-
late that a case might be referred by the court for consideration by the 
Council and the Council can also remand a case to the concerned court 
when it finds that there is no need to interpret the constitution or may 
instruct the court to suspend a proceeding or execution of a case which 
is under consideration. However the matter requires thinking beyond 
that, as it is impossible to draw a clear demarcation in their scope of 
competence. Courts can not avoid consideration of the constitution in 
disposing cases that come to their attention and no sufficient guidance 
to that effect is developed. Then cases being handled by the judiciary 
can reach the Council of Constitutional Inquiry on referral by the 
courts or when filed by an interested party. So far, only a couple of 
cases have been referred to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry by 
the courts. These are cases referred by the North Gonder Woreda 
Court and The Federal First Instance Court. Else the courts seem 
inclined to entertain cases that are brought to their attention and are 
within their competence. In the absence of clear reason, courts tend to 
avoid blanket referral of all claims of constitutionality or constitu-
tional interpretation to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry. 
XI. THE PLACE OF TRADITIONAL AND 
RELIGIOUS RULES AND INSTITUTIONS 
Ethiopia is a country of diverse culture, religion, tradition and local 
institutions. Added to that, the constitutional recognition of the right to 
be adjudicated by traditional and religious institutions and other 
related rights implementation poses a challenge in view of constitu-
tional interpretation or adjudication. The traditional or religious laws 
in some aspects are likely to emerge inconsistent with the principles 
and rules enshrined in the formal laws, particularly with some of the 
rights recognised by the constitution. There may therefore arise 
instances where determination of constitutionality could be at issue, 
calling for the role of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the 
House of Federation. This may present a formidable difficulty invol-
ving complex issues related to determination of the interaction 
between the formal laws and religious rules such as the Sharia and the 
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Gadda system in Oromia. How do these constitutionally recognised 
and partly institutionalised religious or customary institutions interact 
with these constitutional organs? Does the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry need to consider the rules of these organs in executing its task 
of interpreting the constitution or detemuning issues of constitu-
tionality? What should the relationship between rules of these institu-
tions and the constitution be? This could be complicated especially in 
the absence of detailed rules to guide such an interaction. 
Though not many cases have yet arisen in this regard, there was an 
instance where a case had reached the CCI and had its root in the right 
to be adjudicated by religious laws and institutions. If we, for instance, 
compare this issue with the system adopted in Egypt for similar 
matters, the Egyptian constitution incorporates explicit provisions that 
guide the determination by the constitutional court on such issues. 
These provisions state that Islam is the official religion and that the 
principal source of legislation is Islamic jurisprudence. At the other 
end the Ethiopian federal and state constitutions declare the separation 
of state and religion in an explicit manner. However, no mechanism 
seems to have been established yet, as no significant literature or 
precedence has been developed in this regard. Thus, if an issue of such 
a nature arises, its determination won't be easy as there are no 
developed rules or precedents to guide it. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident that the present mechanism of constitutional control in 
Ethiopia is characterized by a dual setup envisaged by the federal and 
state constitutions. All the state constitutions have addressed this issue 
while only very few have established the institutions necessary for its 
execution. Owing to the prevailing ethnic, cultural and religious 
diversity such mode of arrangement of constitutional adjudication 
seems necessary. However, the absence of the institutional setting to 
ensure implementation of this task at state level is undoubtedly 
affecting the overall process of constitutional adjudication. Consi-
dering the complex federal framework that is in place, coupled with 
the prevailing pluralistic mode of adjudication (i.e. the judiciary in the 
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traditional institutions by the federal and state constitutions) and the 
broader recognition of human rights, one can envision the complexity 
of issues that this process of adjudication is expected to address. 
Besides, no system has been developed to delimit the scope of compe-
tence between the state and federal organs of constitutional 
adjudication. Consequently some cases, in the event of rejection by 
the federal Council of Constitutional Inquiry on grounds of non-ex-
haustion of local remedies, are likely to remain unaddressed. 
Since the Council of Constitutional Inquiry commenced its function in 
1996, the cases that appear before it are growing in size and 
complexity. The complexity of issues caused by the dual setup of the 
system of constitutional adjudication, the multicultural and multilin-
gual background of society and the degree of constitutional recogni-
tion accorded to rights and freedoms warrants a full-time Council that 
is able to execute its task with sufficient time and research. Though 
the proclamation on the House of Federation instructs for deliberation 
of decisions on constitutional adjudication in the shortest possible 
time, in reality constitutional adjudication is taking longer time than 
anticipated by the law. The fact that the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry is organised to work in sessions has partly contributed to this. 
Owing to the complexity of issues that call for constitutional adjudi-
cation, it appears that the Council of Constitutional Inquiry needs to 
be organised to work full time and be assisted by full-time experts. 
This is a matter that the Council of Constitutional Inquiry proclama-
tion has also provided, stating that members of the Council may be 
assigned to work at the head office permanently. Therefore, conside-
ring the precedence effect and the far-reaching consequence of the 
decisions of the House of Federation, the Council needs to be institu-
tionalised in order to be in a shape to assist the House to the level 
required. 
A matter of equal importance in this regard is that the decisions of the 
House need to be publicized and made accessible. No clear mecha-
nism of communicating rulings of the House is however in place yet. 
In the absence of this mechanism it will be difficult for respective 
institutions and parties to identify whether the Council and the House 
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remedies is adopted as a principle in the process of constitutional 
adjudication, parties are required to comply with that. However in the 
absence of publicity of decisions of the House, parties will be faced 
with difficulty in the exercise of this right. 
The role of the judiciary in the present system of constitutional 
adjudication is not very clear. It however appears that the judiciary in 
the execution of its daily functions can not be prevented from 
applying the constitution as it is difficult to imagine a court case that 
doesn't involve consideration of the constitution. That seems also to be 
what is going on in practice as not many cases are being referred by 
the courts to the Council. 
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